Autore
Ratti, Giovanni BattistaTitolo
The Russell/Copleston Debate: The Final RoundPeriodico
Ragion praticaAnno:
2025 - Volume:
65 - Fascicolo:
2 - Pagina iniziale:
491 - Pagina finale:
504This essay examines Bertrand Russell’s arguments in his debate with F.C. Copleston on morality and moral obligations and demonstrates Russell’s argumentative and philosophical strengths despite certain challenges to his position. First, it refutes Copleston’s claim that emotivism inevitably leads to normative relativism by showing that Russell successfully argues for emotivism while rejecting normative relativism without internal contradiction. Second, it addresses Copleston’s claim that ethical consensus implies transcendental inspiration by emphasizing Russell’s argument that moral rightness, if it exists, is independent of collective opinion and that it is a logical fallacy to infer transcendental facts from converging views. It also examines Russell’s empirical approach to moral obligation, which attributes its significance to educational and social influences, in contrast to Copleston’s ontological position. Finally, it is argued that in addressing concerns about the possible negative moral consequences of his view, Russell could have combined empirical reasoning with conceptual tools that he forged himself – such as the argument from compossibility – to strengthen his position.
SICI: 1720-2396(2025)65:2<491:TRDTFR>2.0.ZU;2-O
Testo completo:
https://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.1415/118608Testo completo alternativo:
https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1415/118608Esportazione dati in Refworks (solo per utenti abilitati)
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