Autore
Enström, Anna

Titolo
On the Inversions of Hypochondria. Centering the Force of Sensibility and Negativity in Aesthetic Experience
Periodico
Estetica
Anno: 2024 - Fascicolo: 3 - Pagina iniziale: 519 - Pagina finale: 536

Whether we consider the nature of positive or negative aesthetic experiences, situating Kantian aesthetics within the framework of the critical system entails addressing the inherent negativity of the aesthetic itself. This article revisits the critical potential of aesthetic negativity to incite crisis in the discourses of science and morality (Menke 1991). By examining Kant’s notes on the displeasure of hypochondria as a principle of inversion ("Verkehrtheit") in representation, it identifies a reciprocity between the aesthetic and hypochondriac mood ("Gemütstimmung") (section three, «The Conflict of the Faculties»). Both moods denote intense, transgressive states between receptivity and spontaneity pertaining to the (self-)reflective sensibility of thought; the tautegorical sensation of thinking itself (Lyotard 1994). I argue that the aesthetic problematics of hypochondria’s psychosomatic self-reflexivity resonate in the negativity of the unregulated maximizing of the faculties characterizing their free play in aesthetic judgment. By highlighting the hypochondriac (hyper) sensibility, the critical impact of aesthetic experience’s infinite negativity regarding conceptual determinations, which «strengthens and reproduces itself» in the face of the object (CPJ, § 12), is emphasized. Aligning with readings that stress the importance of mind disorders in understanding Kantian philosophy (Comay 2016, David-Ménard 2000, Feloj 2022, Nancy 2008, Rauer 2007), Kant’s reflection on his hypochondriac sensibility is used as an analytical lens to explore a key aspect of aesthetic judgment in the "Critique of the Power of Judgment". I argue that the formal correspondence between these distinct moods underscore the crucial role of sensibility in Kant’s aesthetics, which is often overshadowed by understanding or reason in canonical (Guyer 1979, Allison 2001) as well as recent critical (Lloyd 2019) interpretations. The basis for the commonality between pathological and aesthetic self-reflexivity lies in Kant’s discovery in the third Critique regarding the relationships between sensibility, understanding, and reason. Deleuze notes that while the first and second "Critiques" feature strict regulation by one dominant faculty, the third "Critique" introduces the potential for free, unregulated relations among the faculties. This shift has significant implications for sensibility, which moves from being logically confined in the "Critique of Pure Reason" to, in the third "Critique", concern an aesthetic, «a "pathos" beyond all logic» (Deleuze 1984, p. XII). If the first "Critique" focuses on the separation and orderly reunion of concepts and sensibility, the force of sensibility in the aesthetic «discordant accord» establishes a relation to phenomena without relying on conceptual powers (CPJ, § 1). Unlike the positivity of determinant ("bestimmt") judgment, the purposelessness of the aesthetic Gemütsstimmung allows the given to emerge as new or radically other, evoking a sense of modesty and mystery toward the world’s diversity, with potential radical effects on its social organization (Rancière 2004).



SICI: 2039-6635(2024)3<519:OTIOHC>2.0.ZU;2-4
Testo completo: https://www.rivisteweb.it/download/article/10.14648/117557
Testo completo alternativo: https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.14648/117557

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