Autore
Zanellato, MatteoTitolo
Efficiency and Loyalty: Administrative Populism and the Governance of Public Healthcare in VenetoPeriodico
Rivista italiana di politiche pubblicheAnno:
2025 - Fascicolo:
3 - Pagina iniziale:
409 - Pagina finale:
444This article examines the applicability of the theory of administrative populism – developed by Peters and Pierre (2019) and expanded by Bauer (2023) – to the case of the Veneto Region, a paradigmatic example of subnational stability and administrative efficiency. Through a diachronic analysis of the 2015 and 2020 electoral programmes of the regional centre-right coalition and the healthcare reform introduced by Regional Law No. 19/2016, the study tests five expectations: re-functionalization of expertise, systemic politicization, loyalty-based elite selection, structural centralization, and selective budgetary reconfiguration. The findings show that administrative populism can operate in contexts marked by technocratic legitimacy and a rhetoric of efficiency, as Veneto’s reforms strengthen rather than dismantle governance structures, consolidating executive control under the guise of rationalization and good governance.
SICI: 1722-1137(2025)3<409:EALAPA>2.0.ZU;2-K
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